關於愛，我是個小學生。

mid-term presentation of 'surviving death', mark johnston, pp. 305~331

1. what john stuart mill calls 'the religion of humanity'

a. selfishness for those who are wrapped up by themselves hinders them from identifying their feelings with anything which will survive them. and they require the notion of another selfish life beyond the grave to enable them to keep up any interest in existence, which dwindles into something too insignificant to be worth caring about with the termination of life approaching.

b. but if the religion of humanity were as sedulously cultivated as the supernatural religions are, all who have been under such moral cultivation would live ideally in the life of those who are to follow them.

johnston's view on mill:

a. in naturalistic view of death by kant, we are obliged to be moral.

b. no persisting selves (an opinion shared with derek parfit)

c. no independent justifiers

d. implementation of personal identity is response-dependent, protean (p.306)

2. analysis of parfit's view:

a. reduction (offloading) of personal identity

b. 'fission effect': gushing particular continuities

c. within ethical outlook, personal identity is entirely dispensable

d. syllogism of teletransprtation:

the fact that 'my replica will not be me'

would consist in the fact that

'there will not be physical continuity'

and

'because this is so, replica will not have its normal cause'

johnston regarded 'not in general reliable' and 'unintuitive', too soon to conclude from materialism to an 'anatta' nihilism. (p.311)

3. parfit's new theory on personal identity - 'copse theory'

a. when a claim of constitution is made true by the way we use our words or by which concepts we deploy then we surely have the option of using other words or other concepts. and if we eschew the battery of concepts that just serve to describe the constituting facts, and our diminished description of the world will still be complete in one clear and important sense. (p.312)

b. copse = soul + brains + body (p.313)

c. x, existing at t, is the same person as y, existing at t', if and only if xSy (p.315)

4. socrates' great guesses:

a. there is something for us in death, something better for the good than for the bad, without recourse to supernaturalism.

b. the good survive death in a way that is not open to those who are not good.

c. johnston's guess: really good people are not only able to face down death, but also survive death. (p.318)

5. higher order (p.321)

A TYPE AND TWO TOKENS

THE

THE

6. truth is stranger than fiction: clone, phoenix, teleporter (pp.321-328)

7. disposition policing:

three worst cases of psychological syndrome:

a. 強人所難 (體制性)

b. 妄下論斷 (因果性)

c. 以文害意 (過渡性) (p.329)

8. 小結：

a. 老子曰：為學日益，為道日損。

b. 關尹子曰：物我交心生，兩木摩火生，心本無心，因物而見，物我相交而心生顯見，如兩木相鑽摩而生火也，故云物我交心生，兩木摩火生也。

不可謂之在我，不可謂之在彼，不可謂之非我，不可謂之非彼，執而彼我之，則愚。

我本無我，因物來干，心忽顯見，非我自生心也，故云不可謂之在我也。物來相感，心雖顯見，心如虛空，與彼物無礙，故云不可謂之在彼也。若無我者，物雖來感，則心不生，心既有生，不可謂之非我也，故云不可謂之非我也。我未無我 彼物若不來感，則心亦不生，心本不生，因感而生，不可謂之非彼物也，故云不可謂之非彼也。迷人不悟無我無心，與物無礙，而妄立我心，與物作對，執有彼我，觸物有礙，非愚而何，故云執而彼我之則愚也。而者，汝也，執汝彼我而不忘，乃愚迷之人也。此章明心本無彼我，與物無礙，迷人妄立彼我，與物作對也。

c. 神峰逍遙子曰：我之思慮日變，有使之者，非我也，命也，苟知惟命，外不見我，內不見心。故我一身雖有知有力，有音有行，未嘗有我。

d. 結論：因『決無離心之境，定有內識之心，故萬法唯識』而『遮無外境，唯識無境』。行識者，源於我性而不見真如，本亦不可說；莊子頓言，引玉以明性也。