關於愛，我是個小學生。

原來，要成為理想的國度，根據偉大的哲人所言，須要讓 '對的人' 治理國家啊！每個人，尤其是有才能的人，若能多關心點政治，可以讓這樣的理想較易實現：

"好人不肯為統治而公開要錢，落下僱傭的名聲。也不肯私下從公款裡揩油，落下盜賊的名聲。他們既無野心、也就不要求榮譽。在這種情形下，要讓他們服務，非使他們感到有此需要不可、非怕受罰不可。......懲罰中最可怕的部份在於， 拒絕參與統治的人，會被更糟糕的人統治。 我認為，這種恐懼誘使好人擔任公職：這不是說他們願意，而是非出來不可。"

~柏拉圖，理想國，卷一〈正義的意義〉，347c，p.39

英文版的翻譯：

"Therefore, Thrasymachus, it is plain by now that no art or kind of rule provides for its own benefit, but, as we have been saying all along, it provides for and commands the one who is ruled, considering his advantage—that of the weaker—and not that of the stronger. It is for just this reason, my dear Thrasymachus, that said a moment ago that no one willingly chooses to rule and get mixed up in straightening out other people's troubles; but he asks for wages, because the man who is to do anything fine by art never does what is best for himself nor does he command it, insofar as he is commanding by art, but rather what is best for the man who is ruled. It is for just this reason, as it seems, that there must be wages for those who are going to be willing to rule—either money, or honor, or a penalty if he should not rule.”

"What do you mean by that, Socrates?" said Glaucon. "The first two kinds of wages I know, but I don't understand what penalty you mean and how you can say it is a kind of wage.”

"Then you don't understand the wages of the best men," I said,  "on account of which the most decent men rule, when they are willing to rule. Or don't you know that love of honor and love of money are said to be, and are, reproaches?”

"I do indeed," he said.

"For this reason, therefore," I said, "the good aren't willing to rule for the sake of money or honor. For they don't wish openly to exact wages for ruling and get called hirelings, nor on their own secretly to take a profit from their ruling and get called thieves. Nor, again, will they rule for the sake of honor. For they are not lovers of honor. Hence, necessity and a penalty must be there in addition for them, if they are going to be willing to rule—it is likely that this is the source of its being held to be shameful to seek to rule and not to await necessity—and the greatest of penalties is being ruled by a worse man if one is not willing to rule oneself. It is because they fear this, in my view, that decent men rule, when they do rule; and at that time they proceed to enter on rule, not as though they were going to something good, or as though they were going to be well off in it; but they enter on it as a necessity and because they have no one better than or like themselves to whom to turn it over. For it is likely that if a city of good men came to be, there would be a fight over not ruling, just as there is now over ruling; and there it would become manifest that a true ruler really does not naturally consider his own advantage but rather that of the one who is ruled. Thus everyone who knows would choose to be benefited by another rather than to take the trouble of benefiting another. So I can in no way agree with Thrasymachus that the just is the advantage of the stronger.